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I. INTRODUCTION
The initiative process was created originally to enable citizens to enact
public policy directly and, in so doing, to overturn the dominion of interest
groups and of state and local party machines.1 In recent years, initiatives
have been thought to serve as a check on legislative authority and to
provide the people with a means to pressure the legislature into adopting
more public-regarding policies. 2 Indeed, the general consensus emerging
from the most recent academic research is that, at their worst, initiatives are
benign and, at their best, they serve to further the interests of electoral
3
majorities.
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1. For an overview of the history of initiatives and political parties, see Daniel A. Smith, Was
Rove Right? The Partisan Wedge and Turnout Effects of Issue 1, Ohio's 2004 Ballot Initiative to Ban
Gay Marriage (Jan. 2005) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Symposium on the Impact of Direct
Democracy, University of California, Irvine, Jan. 14-15, 2005), at http://lawweb.usc.edu/cslp/
conferences/direct-democracy_05/documents/smith.pdf.
2. Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of PopularInitiatives, 40 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 99 (1996).
3.

See ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE

PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION (1999) [hereinafter GERBER: THE POPULIST PARADOX]; JOHN G.
MATSUSAKA,

FOR THE MANY

OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY AND

AMERICAN

DEMOCRACY (2004) [hereinafter MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY]; Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia,
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A few scholars, however, have found reason to pause in their
celebration of the initiative, finding shortcomings in its process, its
outcomes, or both.4 In this Article we argue that initiatives will only
infrequently improve the public's welfare. We begin with a survey of the
basic social choice and public choice critiques of the initiative process. We
argue that, despite recent rigorous scholarly attention on the effects of
initiatives, 5 we find little reason yet to reject the social and public choice
criticisms of policymaking via direct democracy. We then offer a series of
anecdotes about the rise of "crypto-initiatives," which are initiatives that
use direct democracy as an instrument to achieve nonpolicy-related goals.
Finally, we conclude that the problems inherent in the initiative process are
being magnified by the increase in crypto-initiatives and the rise of the
crypto-political machines, the new 5276 political action committees
("PACs"), that sponsor them. Increasingly, the public welfare may be only
an incidental consideration in the sponsorship, passage, and
implementation of initiatives. 7 This in turn implies that we consider anew
limiting or amending the initiative process.
Campaign Competition and Policy Responsiveness in Direct Legislation Elections, 17 POL. BEHAV. 287
(1995); Gerber, supra note 2; Elisabeth R. Gerber, Pressuring Legislatures Through the Use of the
Initiative: Two Forms of Indirect Influence, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE

UNITED STATES 191-208, (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998); D. Roderick Kiewiet & Kristin Szakaly,
Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 62 (1996); Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old
Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 463 (2004); John G. Matsusaka, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative:
Evidence from the Last 30 Years, 103 1. POL. ECON. 587 (1995) [hereinafter Matsusaka, Evidence];
John G. Matsusaka, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the FirstHalf of the 2 0 h Century, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 619 (2000); John G. Matsusaka & Nolan M. McCarty, Political Resource Allocation: Benefits
and Costs of Voter Initiatives, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 413 (2001).
4.

See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF

MONEY 1, 3-5 (2000); ELISABETH R. GERBER, ARTHUR LUPIA, MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS & D.
RODERICK KIEWIET, STEALING THE INITIATIVE: How STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT

DEMOCRACY 4-5 (2001); Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Principlesof State ConstitutionalDesign, in
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND

RESPONSIVE 9, 20-21, 23-26 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995); Elizabeth Garrett, Who
Directs Direct Democracy?,4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 18 (1997); Elisabeth R. Gerber, Arthur
Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The
Politics of Implementation and Enforcement, 66 J. POL. 43 (2004); Mathew D. McCubbins, Putting the
State Back into State Government: The Constitution and the Budget, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN
CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE, supra, at 353, 353-

55.
5. See Lupia & Matsuska, supra note 3.
6. See I.R.C. § 527 (2000).
7. There are many forms of initiatives: constitutional, statutory, bonds, and annexation to name
a few. In this Article we are primarily concerned with state level initiatives that are either constitutional
or statutory in nature.

2005]

SOCIAL CHOICE

II. POLICIES, INITIATIVES, AND THE LEGISLATURE
We begin with a discussion of the likely types of policies that will be
pursued through initiatives. We will argue in this section that the initiatives
that appear on the ballot are likely to be extreme relative to the legislative
median. In the sections that follow, we will argue that voters face
significant informational and agenda manipulation problems, which can
lead to the adoption of policies that are worse than the status quo for most
of the public.
Although we will later discuss the rise of crypto-initiatives, for which
policy is not the primary goal, let us begin by considering initiatives for
which policy change is the primary goal. We assume that there is someone
who wants to change policy, and as a starting point, we assume a simple
spatial model of policy choice, as is common in the literature. 8 We assume
8.

See DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); ANTHONY

DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional
Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27 (1979). In
particular, as in Kenneth Shepsle's work, we use six assumptions to model agenda setting in the
legislature. First, there are K policy dimensions or issues that can be adjusted by the legislature. Both
status quo policies and policy proposals (bills) are represented as points in K-dimensional Euclidean
space. Second, there are M members in the legislature, whose preferences over the policy dimensions
are additively separable and who vote strategically. Specifically, on any given dimension k, legislatorj
has a unique ideal point on that dimension, .4, which is common knowledge. The utility that legislator j
derives from a given policy vector, z = (zl....,zn), declines with the sum of the distances between N and
z4: uk(z) = XI - k. We assume that members seek to maximize the utility that they derive
j
from the final policy choice of the legislature (in other words, they seek to minimize the summed
distances between their ideal points and the final choices on each dimension). A consequence of this
assumption is that the model of policy choice is, in essence, reduced to a series of independent
unidimensional choices. Third, any legislator may introduce a bill dealing with any single issue
dimension. Such bills may or may not be allowed onto the floor, depending on the actions taken at the
agenda-setting stage. Fourth, there exist agenda-setting agents who have the right to block bills from
reaching the floor within their (fixed) jurisdictions. Fifth, the legislative sequence consists of only four
stages: (1) members introduce bills; (2) some agent selects (or some agents select) the bills that the floor
will consider (more specifically, the agents veto the bills they wish to veto and the remainder are
thereby selected for floor consideration); (3) the floor then considers the bills presented to it, one by
one, amending them as it sees fit; and (4) the floor then votes on final passage of each bill (as amended
if amended). Sixth, wel focus on the special case in which all bills are considered under open rules,
subject only to a germaheness restriction, as this is the simplest case to exposit.
Shepsle suggests that there are three possible agenda-setting agents in the legislature: the
Committee of the Whole, legislative parties, and committees. See Shepsle, supra, at 31-32. The third
possibility, wherein autonomous and independent committees set the floor agenda, is the topic of
Shepsle and Barry Weingast's classic analyses. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, StructureInduced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503 (1981). Gary Cox and Mathew
McCubbins's focus is on the agenda-setting powers of the first two agents listed: the floor as a whole
and the parties, the majority party in particular. GARY W. COX & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE
AGENDA: RESPONSIVE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2005). For our

analysis here it does not matter who we think is the legislative agenda setter.
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that each policy dimension is separable and that legislators, initiative
sponsors, and voters have preferences that are separable by dimension. Let
SQk be the status quo policy on dimension k. Policy can change in one of
two ways: (1) either the legislature enacts a new policy, Zk, which in a onedimensional model, by Black's Theorem, 9 would move policy to Fk, the
floor median; or (2) the people can pass an initiative, ik. If policy remains
unchanged then SQk is the final policy outcome.
We further assume that actions are costly. That is, it is costly to lobby
the legislature to get them to take up issue K E [1 .... K] and change policy
on that issue to Fk. 10 The legislature can handle far fewer than K issues per
term, and thus, in simplest terms, lobbyists must pay those who control the
legislative agenda to induce them to incur the opportunity costs of acting
on issue K. We will ignore the game that this creates among lobbyists, as
that is the topic of another paper." If a policy advocate with an ideal point
xk = ik seeks to change policy on issue K, as illustrated in Figure 1 (where
we have dropped the subscript k), and is able to pay the cost to have the
legislature put it on the agenda (denoted CL), then the legislature will adopt
Fk, on issue K, even though the sponsor would prefer ik.
FIGURE 1. Placement of policy if legislature acts
issue K

i

F

SQ

9. BLACK, supra note 8.
10. F may differ on each issue, but for simplicity and without loss of generality, we drop the
issue subscripts here. In addition to those mentioned above, our model makes the following
assumptions: (1) there is no more than one group actively lobbying on one issue K in each year; (2)
voters view the K dimensions as independent, separable issues; (3) the utility that a group gets from a
change in a policy is equal to the absolute value of the distance between the status quo and a new policy
such as i, given by JSQ - ii; (4) the costs of lobbying the legislature to take up an issue, CL, are equal for
all groups lobbying in all issue dimensions, as are the costs of financing an initiative C; and (5) paying
the costs of running an initiative campaign will result in the initiative passing with probability p, while
paying the costs of lobbying the legislature will lead to the legislature adopting F with certainty.
11. A more traditional model of lobbying might posit that the interest group pays a fee in order to
shift the legislative floor's ideal point from a position that perfectly represents constituents to a
corrupted ideal point that is closer to the interest group's goal. Indeed, this sort of corruption of
legislatures by lobbyists is precisely what motivated many Progressives to push for direct democracy in
the first place. KEVIN STARR, INVENTING THE DREAM: CALIFORNIA THROUGH THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
199-234 (1985). Whether the policy passed by the floor (F), however, reflects the floor's true ideal
point, or instead a revealed preference influenced by the lobbyists' efforts, does not change the
subsequent finding of our model, which is that groups will only pursue costly initiatives when they
move policy much farther away from the status quo than the legislature would have.
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Notice that the legislature will not be able to guarantee the adoption of
a policy other than the floor median, Fk. Once the legislature brings a
proposal to the floor on issue KC,majoritarian influences will move policy to
the floor median, Fk. Coherent, concerted majorities may be able to pass a
policy different than Fk, using closed rules or disciplined voting, but they
will not be able to always guarantee this outcome.
Therefore, a policy advocate has to judge whether Fk is sufficient,
given the lobbying costs, or whether an initiative should be sought in an
attempt to force the enactment of ik, given the costs of qualifying and
passing an initiative (denoted CI) and the probability (denoted p) of passing
an initiative located at ik. 12 Dropping the subscripts for ease of exposition,
notice that if i is to the right of SQ, as in Figure 2, the policy advocate will
never lobby the legislature for access as the policy will end up at F, making
the policy advocate worse off than leaving the policy at SQ.
FIGURE 2. Initiative sponsor will not lobby legislature

I
F

issue K

SQ

If it is indeed more costly to qualify and pass an initiative than it is to
lobby the legislature for consideration of a new policy on issue K, then we
will see only two types of initiatives. 13 First, as in Figure 1, if i is close to
F, then it will not be worth the extra cost (relative to the cost of lobbying)
of qualifying and passing an initiative, and the initiative sponsor will
choose a lobbying strategy or will sit out the policymaking process and
accept whatever the legislature produces. Thus, only initiatives that are
12. An interest group will pursue one of the three actions when the expected utility from that
action (calculated by subtracting the cost of the action from the product of the probability of success
and the group's utility from successful policy change) exceeds the expected utilities from each of the
other actions. Thus, the group will lobby the legislature when it yields a higher expected utility than the
status quo (when JSQ - F] - CL> 0) and a higher utility than attempting an initiative (when SQ - F1 - CL
> p(ISQ - il) - C1), otherwise lobbying would not be worthwhile. The group would attempt to qualify
and pass an initiative, whose policy is located at i, if and only if p(SQ - il) - C, > JSQ - F] - CL and
when p(ISQ - il) - CL > 0. For simplicity, to elucidate the decision problem for individuals, groups, and
parties in picking their strategies, we have ignored the gaming aspects between competing groups that
will greatly affect, in subtle ways, lobbying and initiative strategies. We leave that exercise for a
different venue.
13. If we relaxed our assumption that utility smoothly declined with distance from the status quo,
it would be possible that an interest group with an extremely steep utility function centered at a point in
between the status quo and the floor median would find it worthwhile to sponsor an initiative located
between SQ and F. Because we cannot think of any such initiative, however, we do not alter our model
in order to make this possible.
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extreme relative to F, the legislative median, will be brought to the public
as proposed policy changes.1 4 If the probability, p, of passing an initiative
declines the further i is from SQ, then there will exist a tradeoff between
the costs of passing an initiative, C1, and the probability of getting it passed,
which will impart a pressure on the policy advocate to move the proposed
policy away from the ideal point and closer to SQ. This tradeoff creates a
limit on how extreme policy advocates will make their initiatives.
Second, if i is on the other side of SQ from F, as in Figure 2, then
policy advocates will never pursue a lobbying strategy and will instead "go
public" with an initiative to change policy. Such an action, however, would
seem to be discouraged by strategic calculations, since the legislature could
then respond by placing a referendum on the ballot to move policy back to
F or to the voting median, V, if the median voter prefers i to F and SQ (and
if V is closer to F than is i). 15 The condition for an initiative of this sort to
be placed on the ballot is that V must be on the same side of SQ as is i and
on the opposite side of F. Presumably, by Black's Theorem, V wins if it is
offered to the people as a referendum, so the question for the policy
advocate is whether it is worth the costs of proposing an initiative on this
issue in order to get V. If V is close to SQ, then the answer is almost surely
that it is not worth it. So, again, only extreme initiatives will be proposed.' 6
Extreme policies seem unlikely to enhance the public welfare, but they
need not necessarily be bad. If the transactions costs associated with
enforcement, however, grow with the distance of the policy change from
SQ, then we may begin to think otherwise. Numerous transaction costs
arise from the process of enforcing a new rule: the cost of investigating
violations of the rule, the costs of bringing suits alleging violations of the
rule, the administrative costs of the agency enforcing the rule, the public's
cost of monitoring the government agency that enforces the rule, the costs
of the losses that occur due to undeterred violations of the law, the costs of
policing opportunistic behavior, and the costs associated with new
behaviors that arise as people seek to get out from under the rule's effects.
The larger the policy change, the higher the dead weight losses associated
with it (because the more you are taking, the harder people will try to avoid
14. The extremity of i, relative to F, will depend on the relative costs of lobbying versus the
initiative process. As the initiative process increases in cost, both in terms of qualification and passage,
we expect initiatives to be more extreme.
15. Presumably, V is at or near F, at least in a district-by-district vote, ignoring problems of
bicameralism and divided government, If V is indeed at or near F, then the threat of legislative
referendum would be enough to deter any initiatives such as diagrammed in Figure 2.
16. We will ignore the costs of getting the legislature to implement initiative policies that are far
from F. For a review of that thorny issue, see GERBER ET AL., supra note 4, at 12-25.
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it, and the easier it will be to avoid, the more expensive will be the
enforcement, and so on). It seems reasonable to assume that transaction
costs increase monotonically (if not faster) with the distance of the policy
change from SQ. 17 There is a point, then, at some distance from SQ, where
the transaction costs of a policy change exceed the sum of utility gains (if
if the policy change is otherwise favored by the
any) for society, even
8
V.1
voting median,
The problem is exacerbated for initiatives, as the electoral
environment in which voters make their decisions lacks informational cues
about these transactions costs. 19 In the legislative process, by comparison,
lobbyists, agencies, and constituents can inform legislators about dead
weight losses more effectively, and political parties have positions about
both acceptable dead weight losses and who should bear them. The
implication of this reasoning is that policy proposals that end up on the
ballot as initiatives are likely to lead to20 lower social welfare than policies
enacted through the legislative process.
We turn next to argue that policies enacted through the initiative
process are unlikely to be welfare enhancing and more likely to be merely
wealth transfers or some other form of particularistic policy.
17. Essentially, we are assuming that, in developed states, we are past the point of increasing
returns to scale in coercion and are decreasing returns to scale in coercion. John Wallis and Douglas
North show that transactions costs grew as a percent of GNP in the United States over the twentieth
century. John J. Wallis & Douglas C. North, Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American
Economy, 1870-1970, in LONG-TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 95 (Stanley L.

Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 1986). This appears to be true for other developed countries in
Europe and for Japan as well.
18. If the SQ imposes significant costs, then bigger policy changes might mean imposing less
costs, resulting in lower transaction costs as more people choose to cooperate with the new policy. The
increase in compliance will be at least partially offset by the likely decrease in compliance from groups
that bear the costs of the new policy change. The net change in compliance and enforcement will affect
the overall change in transaction costs.
19. As evidence for this proposition consider that many initiatives start out with high voter
approval that declines as the opposition campaign gets started and that heavy spending can defeat
almost any initiative. Often ad campaigns sell initiatives as good for everyone or bad for everyone,
obscuring their true costs. Occasionally, campaigns highlight that the policy is good only for a few
beneficiaries. Rarely do initiative campaigns highlight the direct transfer of resources from one group to
another. When the costs are highlighted, the opposition message may get out in enough ways to make
the losses seem large.
20. We may assume that the further the initiative i is from F (and likely the further it is from V),
the less likely it is to pass. But, the probability is not zero, and the potential benefits may lead advocates
for such a policy change to pursue a large gamble through the context of an initiative.
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III. WHO BENEFITS FROM INITIATIVES?
Initiative campaigns are costly. In 2002 over $173 million was spent
on campaigns for 117 initiatives. 2 The most expensive initiative campaign
in 2002 was the "Yes on Arizona 202" campaign on behalf of Indian
gaming, which cost over $21 million. 22 This comes nowhere close to the
record $92 million spent on the 1998 initiative campaign for California
Proposition 5, which was also about Indian gaming. 23 This money has to
come from somewhere. What types of policies are most likely to generate
sufficient returns so that the benefits exceed the costs of taking an initiative
to the public? It is fairly standard to categorize public policy according to
how diffuse or concentrated its benefits and costs are. 24 Some policies have
diffuse benefits, or benefits that spread widely in small amounts over the
population, while others have concentrated benefits that are more narrowly
targeted to an easily identifiable set of benefactors. National defense, clean
air, and clean water are examples of policies with diffuse benefits, while
farm price supports or the bail out of Chrysler or Lockheed are seen as
examples of concentrated benefits. Costs can be similarly concentrated or
diffuse. The most commonly used examples of concentrated costs are
luxury taxes or zoning laws, while value-added taxes are considered
diffuse. It is also well known that when benefits or costs are diffuse,
collective action is difficult.2 1 If benefits or costs are concentrated, then
there exists a private entrepreneur, a privileged person, group or party, who
will bear the cost of collective action. Thus, all else constant, as has long
been discussed in the lobbying literature, lobbying should take place only
on policies where there are concentrated benefits or costs. If the same logic
holds for initiatives, only those with concentrated benefits will be proposed
and financed.
21.
GALEN NELSON, BALLOTFINDING.ORG, A BUYER'S GUIDE TO BALLOT MEASURES: THE
ROLE OF MONEY IN 2002 BALLOT INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS (2003), available at http://www.

ballotfunding.org/Buyer'sGuide toBallotMeasureFunding_2002.pdf.
22. Cal. Sec'y of State, Financing California'sStatewide Ballot Measures: Campaign Receipts
and Expenditures Through Dec. 31, 1998, at http://www.ss.ca.gov/prd/bmprimary98-final/bmprimaryfinal-mainpage.htm (last visited May 5, 2005).
23. Id. The willingness to expend such sums of money on the campaigns suggests that there are
significant gains for the sponsors of Indian gaming initiatives.
24. See, e.g., RANDALL B. RIPLEY & GRACE A. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY AND
PUBLIC POLICY (5th ed. 1991); THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
25.

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF

GROUPS 126-27 (2d ed. 1971).
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It is also clear from the literature on initiatives that a vigorous
opposition will almost always sink an initiative at the ballot. 26 Policies and
initiatives with concentrated costs will be more likely to draw organized
opposition, all else constant. Thus, from our typology of initiatives, policies
with concentrated benefits will be most likely to make it on the ballot, and
those with diffuse costs, and thus lacking organized opposition, will be
27
most likely to pass, all else constant.
IV. THE INITIATIVE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
The conclusion about the types of initiatives that will make it on the
ballot has important implications for our understanding of how voters make
decisions on these issues. One of the common findings in models of voter
decisionmaking is that in complete information settings, the majority,
represented by the median voter, is made better off by an initiative process.
The problem is that voters typically do not have complete information or
ready substitutes. Arthur Lupia shows that voters can use cues and
information shortcuts to substitute for complete information.28 Elisabeth
Gerber and Lupia show, however, that this conclusion does not hold in an
incomplete information environment in which voters (1) do not know the
policy implications of an initiative and (2) cannot or chose not to seek
opinions of credible endorsers. 29 Furthermore, Lupia and McCubbins find
that the credibility of an endorsement requires that one of four conditions
for trust exist, the principal one being that there are two endorsers, each
26. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX, supra note 3, at 10-11. But see John M. de Figueiredo,
Chang-Ho Ji & Thad Kousser, Why Do Initiative Backers Waste Their Money? Revisiting the Research
on Campaign Spending and Direct Democracy (Apr. 2005) (unpublished manuscript presented at the
Conference on Direct Democracy in the West: Historical Roots and Political Realities, Stanford
University, April 14-15, 2005, on file with authors) (providing new evidence challenging this finding).
27. We recognize that there are exceptions to this rule. In California, policy entrepreneurs such
as Howard Jarvis (Proposition 13 in 1978) have brought initiatives with diffuse benefits to the ballot.
Such initiatives, however, will only qualify in the rare circumstance that a "privileged group" solves the
inherent collective action problem. See OLSON, supra note 25, at 49-50. This state has also provided
instances of initiatives with concentrated benefits and costs, such as the battles between Indian tribes
with gaming operations and Las Vegas casinos (Propositions 68 and 70 on the November 2004 ballot).
But note that both initiatives faced well-funded opposition campaigns and lost badly.
28. Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in
California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994). On some issues, such as
taxation and social issues, voters may not acquire any information during the campaign process because
they already have well-formed preferences. For other issues, however, that appear on the ballot (such as
nuclear power, the lottery, Indian gaming, school reform, health insurance, and the sale of state land,
among others) voters may need the campaign process to serve informational purposes. It is to these
types of issues that this section is addressed.
29. Gerber & Lupia, supra note 3.
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30
believed to be knowledgeable and each competing on opposing sides.
Moreover, voters must believe that these competing endorsers are strictly
adversarial, analogous to opposing attorneys in a legal setting. If this is not
the case, then the statements made by the initiative competitors may not be
trustworthy and may not be credible to voters. If none of these information
conditions are met, scholars have recognized that policy outcomes from the
31
initiative process may not improve outcomes relative to the status quo.
Given that the ability of voters to make informed decisions depends
crucially on the type of information environment in which voters make
choices, the relevant question becomes: how likely is it that an initiative
campaign will produce the conditions for trust that allow voters to use cues
from endorsers as substitutes for full information?

Although we do not, at present, have the empirical evidence to
determine how often the conditions for trust are met, we can provide
theoretical reasons for suspecting that incomplete information is a more
likely outcome. First, as just discussed, initiatives are unlikely to pass if
there is significant opposition. Because of this, initiative sponsors will
attempt to find issues that do not generate opposition. Initiatives are most
likely to pass, then, if the proposal has diffuse costs, and those who will
pay the costs are unlikely to overcome the collective action problems of
organizing an opposition to the proposal. Without organized opposition, the
conditions for adversarial verification fail. One ironic consequence of this
result is that the proponents may then lack credibility, unless the endorsers
they use to deliver their message to the public otherwise meet one of the
four conditions for trust.
Second, it is unlikely that advertising campaigns will present voters
with information about the tradeoffs between initiatives (either across time
or across items on the same ballot), which means that the initiative
campaigns are unlikely to satisfy the condition regarding knowledge of
30.

ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS

LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNow? 85-86 (1998). Lupia and McCubbins derive and experimentally

test several conditions required for learning. The first of these conditions is the knowledge condition,
which will only be met if the person receiving information believes that an endorser has knowledge or
expertise about what he says. The second general condition is the trust condition, which will only be
met if a person believes that the endorser is trustworthy. In order for this person to believe that an
endorser is trustworthy, however, one of four additional conditions must also be met: (1) the person and
endorser must have common interests; (2) there must be a threat of verification imposed on the
endorser; (3) the endorser must face penalties for lying; or (4) there must be observable, costly effort on
the part of the endorser. See id. at 54-59.
31.
"The conclusion that the majority is always better off having the initiative and referendum
available is a fairly general property of complete information models but does not necessarily hold with
incomplete information." Lupia & Matsusaka, supra note 3, at 477.
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policy implications. With numerous initiatives on the ballot, even if voters
can gain knowledge about each choice individually, they may not be able to
predict the consequences of their actions when the interactive effects of all
initiatives are taken together. Providing information about the tradeoffs
among initiatives or providing information about policy interactions would
seem unlikely to help a campaign, while running the very real risk of
creating opponents out of otherwise indifferent campaigns.
The argument just presented provides good reason to believe that
initiative campaigns will rarely approximate conditions whereby voters can
gain knowledge about their initiative choices. Indeed, Lupia's study of five
1988 California insurance initiatives, which pitted trial lawyers against
insurance companies, seems more like an exception than the rule.3 2 In that
year there were multiple ballot measures all addressing the same general
concerns and both opponents and proponents of the initiatives had a strong
incentive to campaign for their side. The generation of vigorous opposition
and support campaigns suggests that the stakes in this election were
massive because it made sense to run an initiative even in the face of
guaranteed opposition. 33 This provided an environment that was likely to
create the conditions for voters to make informed decisions, as Lupia
found, but it is not clear that this empirical example translates to the typical
election year and to the typical initiative environment, given the
conclusions derived from the typology of initiatives above. 34 Furthermore,
voters must also solve the information problem presented by having many
initiatives at many different levels of government (city, county, and
35
state).
32. Lupia, supra note 28.
33. See id. at 64-65. The expectation of opposition changes the probability of qualifying and
passing an initiative, but if the stakes are high enough the sponsor may still continue with the initiative
process.
34. Most of the literature, including this argument, is directed primarily at statewide campaigns.
The full information conditions seem less likely to occur in the many city, county, or regional initiatives
that change local government charters. For instance, imagine a proposal to change from a weak to
strong mayoral form of government. Is it likely that both sides will be organized and run campaigns?
On the other hand, local initiatives that deal with land use issues probably will tap issues with
concentrated costs and benefits, and thus spur serious campaigns on both sides. Because of this,
however, they are more likely to lose.
35. Between 60% and 70% of the U.S. population lives in a city with an initiative process, and
between 70% and 75% of the U.S. population lives in either a city or a state with an initiative process.
See John G. Matsusaka, Initiative and Referendum Inst., Univ. of S. Cal., I & R in American Cities:
Basic Patterns, at http://www.iandinstitute.org/New%20RI%2OWebsite%20nfo/I&R%20Researcb%
2Oand%2OHistoryfl&R%2Oat%20the%2OLocal%2OLeveVfI&R%2Oin%2OAmerican%2OCities.pdf (last
visited May 5, 2005).
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Lupia and McCubbins, as previously discussed, derive and test the
36
conditions necessary for trust and learning from an information source.
Recent empirical work on the informational aspects of initiatives3 7 has not
explored whether or not these conditions are present in initiative campaigns
and thus whether voters are able to make welfare-enhancing choices. The
implication of experimental research on trust is that simply identifying the
presence of information in the form of advertisements or endorsements
does not allow one to draw the conclusion that voters have learned from the
information. Although the empirical work in this field is of great interest
and has made strides in beginning to identify some effects of the initiative
process, the studies have not yet incorporated the conditions for trust and
learning into their models of the effects of campaigns. Furthermore,
demonstrating that exposure to an initiative campaign increases the
proportion of people who vote, give campaign contributions, or correctly
answer information questions is not equivalent to showing that voters
regularly make choices that improve welfare.
The combination of the slim likelihood that the conditions for
verification will be met and the sheer number of initiatives facing voters in
states such as California further compounds the information problem facing
voters. In the end, it seems unlikely voters will have access to the cues
needed to make informed decisions for most initiatives.
V. WHO IS SETTING THE AGENDA?
We have just argued that initiatives are likely to be extreme and
particularistic policies with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, and that
LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 30.
37.
See, e.g., SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING AND
DIRECT DEMOCRACY (1998); Caroline J. Tolbert, Ramona S. McNeal & Daniel A. Smith, Enhancing
Civic Engagement: The Effect of Direct Democracy on Political Participationand Knowledge, 3 ST.

36.

POL. & POL'Y Q. 23 (2003); Caroline Tolbert, The Ballot Measure/Citizen Interest Link: Information,
Engagement and Participation (Jan. 2005) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Symposium on the

Impact of Direct Democracy, University of California, Irvine, Jan. 14-15, 2005), at http://lawweb.usc.
edu/cslp/conferences/direct democracyO5/documentsholbert.pdf.

This

empirical

work

typically

measures a dependent variable of interest across a variety of states, say voter turnout or survey
responses, and then compares noninitiative states to initiative states. A positive relationship between
being an initiative state and turnout is interpreted as an effect of the initiative. States with initiatives,
however, may not be a random sample of all states, in which case a stronger research design would
have an observation of our dependent variable before the initiative was implemented to definitively
conclude that the initiative caused the change in the variable of interest. Studies like one showing that
increased usage of the initiative process within initiative states leads to higher levels of turnout go part
of the way toward solving this challenge to inference. See, e.g., Caroline J. Tolbert, John A. Grummel
& Daniel A. Smith, The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the American States, 29 AM.
POL. RES. 625 (2001) [hereinafter Effects of Ballot Initiatives].
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there is a significant chance that voters will lack the information necessary
to make informed decisions. So, the odds that initiatives will improve
social welfare seem small. In this section we further question the beneficial
effects of initiatives by considering a variety of social choice critiques that
seem particularly pernicious with respect to the initiative process, critiques
that have largely escaped comment in the literature on initiatives.
A. THE UNIDIMENSIONAL INITIATIVE

One of the key problems with initiatives, and one that leads to a host
of subsequent problems, is that they are likely to be one-dimensional policy
moves with multidimensional repercussions. 38 First, in twelve of the
twenty-three states that allow initiative petitions there are single-subject
rules with regards to proposed initiatives. 39 These rules almost guarantee
that initiatives will only address a single issue, such as increasing school
funding, without presenting voters with the other (obvious) dimensions of
the policy change: increased taxes or decreased spending in another area.
Second, even in the absence of a single-subject rule or where it is loosely
enforced, initiative sponsors will prefer to propose one-dimensional
policies. The addition of a second, third, or fourth dimension is political
suicide because it increases the possibility of generating opposition.
Because opponents of initiatives are more likely to be successful in their
campaign than proponents, there is a strong incentive not to incite more
opponents than necessary. Because of this tactical concern, voters are likely
to see one-dimensional policy moves and be asked to make "yes" or "no"
decisions about a multitude of single dimension ballot measures, which has
important consequences for the results of the initiative process.
B. INABILITY TO MAKE TRADEOFFS

One of the key features of the legislative process, particularly during
the appropriations stage, is that legislators make tradeoffs between
38. It is important to note that in legislative bodies where voting is largely one-dimensional there
is reason to believe that the existence of a single dimension is the result of the legislative process
collapsing many dimensions into a single dimension. Given that the initiative process lacks the
institutions that generate this outcome, it is unreasonable to expect a similar outcome from initiatives.

See

KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL
CALL VOTING 51-57, 227-32 (1997).

39. Initiative and Referendum Inst., Univ. of S. Cal., Comparison of Statewide Initiative
Process, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%201RI%2OWebsite%201nfoDrop%2ODown%20Boxes/
Requirements/A%20Comparison%20of%2OStatewide%201&R%20Processes.pdf (last visited May 5,
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priorities both within a given year's budget and across time. 40 In the
models of voter decisionmaking during initiative campaigns, however,
voters are presumed to be choosing between "yes" and "no" votes on a
single initiative along a single dimension.4 1 In such a situation these models
typically find that initiatives either make the legislature more responsive to
the median voter or that only those policies favored by the median voter
will be approved.42 One limit to these models is that they do not address
how voters make tradeoffs between different initiatives. Consider that in
many elections there are multiple issues on which to vote, and voters must
not only be able to consider the tradeoffs for a particular initiative, but they
must also weigh initiatives against each other. For voters to calculate these
tradeoffs (that is, to determine what they think they will have to give up in
order to get the policy proposed by the initiative) they must do the
following:
(1) have a good idea about how each policy proposal will be financed
(what do they have to give up to get it?), or how it will otherwise
affect the status quo;
(2) know the externalities associated with each proposition (doing one
thing may preclude doing other things or may enable or disable
the successful implementation of other policies);
(3) have knowledge about all of the ballot proposals; and
(4) be able to determine the probability that each of the other
proposals will pass (so they can calculate an expected combined
effect for their actions on each ballot initiative), and these
probabilities must be common knowledge so that all voters act on
similar expectations.
Only when all of these conditions are satisfied can voters make
decisions that aid in moving policy toward their most preferred position. At
the same time, the fact that all the conditions for making a successful
policy choice must be met does not, however, imply that they will never be
40.

Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and Statutory

Revisionism: The Strange Case of the AppropriationsCanon, J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (2005).

41. See Gerber & Lupia, supra note 3, at 290-91; Gerber, supra note 2, at 101-06; Lupia, supra
note 28, at 65-69; Matsusaka & McCarty, supra note 3, at 416.
42. It is worth considering the assumptions contained within these models, because it suggests
how rarely all the conditions will be met. For example, Gerber assumes: (1) a simple binary agenda; (2)
no substitute initiatives; (3) both "yes" and "no" campaigns for verification purposes or voter
knowledge of the policy implications of the initiative; (4) a single-stage game that ends; (5) one
dimension of policy; and (6) 100% voter turnout. Gerber, supra note 2, at 101-06.
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able to do so. Of course, the greater the number of initiatives and the worse
the knowledge environment is for each, the worse off voters will be.
For voters to weigh the policy choice of prisons versus schools, for
example, they must know not only the costs of each policy, but also how
the two policies affect each other. We know that, in the absence of a
tradeoff between services or tax levels, voters will prefer more of almost all
government services, or the same level of services with lower taxes. 43 So,
the relevant question about the information environment is whether voters
will receive and use the information, or substitute cues, to choose between
initiatives focused on schools, jails, lottery, insurance, and nuclear power.
Will cues be sufficient to help voters weigh these perhaps conflicting
policies against each other and to account for the costs of each proposed
policy change? It is difficult to imagine that initiative supporters will
provide this type of universal tradeoff information. The proponents of a
hypothetical measure A are unlikely to argue against measure B (if they are
about different issues), because doing so will likely lead to a response from
the proponents of measure B. Because the opposition has the upper hand in
initiative campaigns, it would appear to be a poor strategy to take action
that increases the likelihood of generating opponents.
Moreover, voters will not even receive information about the costs of
an initiative itself when there is no opposition to that initiative. This is the
case for a great many initiatives, especially the concentrated benefits,
diffuse cost proposals we expect to see on the ballot. Furthermore, our
observation living in California is that information about how the goals of
one initiative interact with the goals of another is unlikely to be widely
available. If voters lack information about how the passage of two
initiatives will affect each other or the general policy environment, it is
easy to have outcomes that lead to non-Pareto improvement, and thus do
not enhance welfare.
C. INITIATIVES AS SEQUENTIAL ELIMINATION AGENDAS

Yet another problem with initiatives relates to what social choice
theorists dub "sequential elimination agendas." 44 Sequential elimination
agendas occur when votes are held one after another, defeated options are
removed from consideration, and the winning issue moves on to the next
43. Earl R. Brubaker, How Big a Budget Do the People Prefer?, 3 INDEP. REV. 211, 212-13
(1998).
44. Peter C. Ordeshook & Thomas Schwartz, Agendas and the Control of PoliticalOutcomes, 81
AM. POL. Sc. REV. 179 (1987).
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round of voting. The core problem with sequential elimination agendas is
that they do not allow citizens to compare directly all of the alternatives
and, therefore, do not allow them to make tradeoffs among their options. It
is this inability to make tradeoffs that often leads to suboptimal outcomes,
and as Peter Ordeshook and Thomas Schwartz emphasize, "as soon as the
feasible agendas are allowed to include . . . sequential elimination
agendas... sincere voting can lead practically anywhere" in the policy
45
space.
For example, consider the following preference rankings for three
individuals, 1, 2, and 3, over four different policies, A, B, C, and Q:
1

2

3

First

Q

A

B

Second

C

Q

A

Third

B

C

Q

Fourth

A

B

C

The game proceeds as follows. 46 First, there is a vote between policy
A and the status quo, Q. Next the new status quo (either A or Q) is pitted
against B. Then, the new SQ (either A, B, or Q) goes against C. If this
voting game were to be actually played out the winner is C, despite the fact
that Q is unanimously preferred to C (thus C is Pareto inferior to Q). The
movement to C is clearly non-welfare enhancing as no possible majority
would choose C over Q, and no one would have wanted to end up with C,
having started at Q.
Although scholars have considered sequential elimination agendas
when analyzing various voting procedures,41 they have not yet applied this
concept to the initiative process, a process that we argue is particularly
45.
46.
(1986).
47.
Schwartz,

Id. at 192.
See PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 68
Peter C. Fishburn, Paradoxesof Voting, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 537 (1974); Ordeshook &
supra note 44, at 182.

SOCIAL CHOICE

2005]

plagued by the pathologies of sequential elimination agendas. Not only
does the initiative process satisfy the conditions just listed above (insofar as
multiple initiatives are voted on over time and initiatives are not pitted
against all other initiatives), but this process also makes it particularly
difficult for citizens to make tradeoffs over time. As the example illustrates,
when proposals are pitted against each other in a sequential or serial
process and the losing proposal is removed from consideration, it can
generate outcomes that no one would prefer.
To see how sequential elimination agendas and the inability to make
intertemporal tradeoffs play out in real world initiative processes, consider
the following examples from Oregon and Massachusetts. In 1990, the
citizens of Oregon passed an initiative that sought to reduce property taxes,
and then, in 1996, they passed another measure that limited the revenue
available for schools and other services that had been funded by property
taxes. 48 Just four years later in 2000, citizens passed an initiative that
established a "sufficiency standard" for funding based on the Oregon
Quality Education Model that required a significant increase in state
spending on education. 49 It is easy to see that following multiple ballot
measures to reduce taxes with one that instructs the legislature to increase
education spending may be mutually inconsistent.
Similar contradictory initiatives occurred in Massachusetts. For
example, in 1982, citizens voted to restrict radioactive waste disposal, but
then in 1988, they failed to ban the electric power plants that produced such
nuclear waste. 50 Needless to say, citizens in these two time periods passed
result
measures that were largely at odds with each other-with the 1988
51
perpetuating the problem that the 1982 initiative sought to solve.
The above anecdotes suggest that the theoretical problems of
sequential elimination agendas have an empirical basis in the initiative
process. Indeed, these anecdotes demonstrate that when citizens must
choose alternatives over time without the ability to compare them directly,
they are unlikely to consider tradeoffs and are, therefore, almost certain to
48. See Initiative and Referendum Inst., Univ. of S. Cal., Oregon: Initiative HistoricalListing, at
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Oregon.htm (last visited May 5, 2005); Or. State Legislature, Ballot
Measure 1: Report from the Legislature, 2001-2003 Education Budget, May 2003, at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/comni/commsrvs/educationfunding.pdf.
49. See Or. State Legislature, supra note 48.
50. See Initiative and Referendum Inst., Univ. of S. Cal., Massachusetts: Initiative Historical
Listing, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Massachusetts.htm (last visited May 5, 2005).
51.

See id.
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that have deleterious economic, social, or
pass contradictory measures
52
political consequences.
D. WHO IS SETTING THE AGENDA?
Another problem with the initiative process is that it does not allow
for careful selection of those who set the agenda. Social choice theorists
and game theorists have long noted that agenda setters can be, for all
intents and purposes, "dictators" when it comes to determining political
outcomes; 53 they have also emphasized that under certain conditions, there
is a risk that agenda setters, through strategically setting the agenda, can
54
induce outcomes that diverge from the preferences of the median voter
and, in fact, are Pareto inferior.5 5 This possibility seems particularly acute
in the initiative setting, given that we previously established that initiatives
will generally be extreme relative to the floor median of the legislature.
Given the existence of such a risk, scholars have analyzed real world
instances of agenda setting and have discussed the ways that agenda setters
can be constrained to be faithful agents of those they represent. 56 Although
there are, of course, many ways to constrain agenda setters, most relevant
to this Article are screening and selection mechanisms.
Screening and selection mechanisms are important because they help
to ensure that faithful agenda setters are chosen in the first place. As many
52. As an example of a deleterious political consequence, consider a legislature charged with
implementing contradictory initiatives. When faced with such contradictions, the legislature will be
unable to satisfy the conflicting demands of citizens, and will therefore partially implement the
initiatives, perhaps generating frustration with government and spawning more initiatives that also
cannot be implemented.
53.

See THOMAS SCHWARTZ, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE (1986); Richard D. McKelvey,

General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models, 47 ECONOMETRICA 1085
(1979); Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the PoliticalEconomy of
Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy, 93 Q.J. ECON. 563, 563-64 (1979) [hereinafter Romer &
Rosenthal, Bureaucrats]; Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation,
Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1978) [hereinafter Romer & Rosenthal,
Political Resource Allocation].
54. Romer & Rosenthal, Bureaucrats,supra note 53; Romer & Rosenthal, Political Resource
Allocation, supra note 53.
55. McKelvey, supra note 53.
56.
See GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993) [hereinafter Cox & MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN];
GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETrING THE AGENDA (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter
Cox & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA]; D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE
LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS (199 1); DAVID
W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE (1991); Kaare Strom & Wolfgang C.
MUller, Political Partiesand Hard Choices, in POLICY, OFFICE, OR VOTES? HOW POLITICAL PARTIES
IN WESTERN EUROPE MAKE HARD DECISIONS 1 (Wolfgang C. Mtiller & Kaare Strom eds., 1999).
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scholars note, ex ante screening and selection are particularly important, for
it can be very costly to sort good agenda setters from bad ones and remove
the bad ones after they have been selected. 57 For this very reason,
legislators worldwide consider the past performance of potential agenda
those who have
setters when selecting them and promote only
58
demonstrated their competence and responsiveness.
With the initiative process, however, it is impossible to screen and
select faithful agenda setters because any individual or group with
sufficient resources can place an initiative on the ballot. This aspect of the
initiative process allows virtually anyone to become an agenda setter, and it
is this direct democracy aspect of the initiative process that is frequently
lauded as one of its greatest strengths. 59 The one mechanism designed to
screen out initiative agenda setters-the requirement that they collect a
specified number of signatures in order to qualify for the ballot-does not
in any way guarantee that sponsors have the public interest in mind. The
industry of paid signature gathering, nearly as old as direct democracy
itself,60 now guarantees that whoever has the requisite amount of money
(now more than $1 million in California) 6 1 can qualify virtually any
initiative for the ballot. As the above discussion of screening and selection
makes clear, however, allowing anyone with sufficient resources to become
an agenda setter is problematic, for there is then no mechanism to select
agenda setters who will pursue policies that benefit a majority of citizens.
Furthermore, with the rise of crypto-initiatives, there will be an increasing
number of agenda setters that use the initiative process to manipulate
outcomes to serve their ends.
E. CONSEQUENCES
As a result of these flaws in the initiative process we believe that
initiatives are likely to lead to deleterious outcomes. They might bust a
state's budget or require lawmakers to balance the budget by cutting
57.

See

KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS,

supra note 56; A.

MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING:

INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974).

58.
See Cox & MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN, supra note 56; COX & MCCUBBINS,
SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 56; Strom & Mfiller, supra note 56.
59.
GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX, supra note 3, at 44-45; MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY,

supra note 3, at 143.
60.

See RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 47-

49 (2002).
61. See Eugene C. Lee, The Initiative Boom: An Excess of Democracy, in GOVERNING
CALIFORNIA: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE GOLDEN STATE 117, 117-18
(Gerald C. Lubenow & Bruce E. Cain eds., 1997).
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services, raising fees, moving programs and their costs off-budget, or
moving the programs as unfunded mandates to lower levels of government
or to the private sector-moves which, if included explicitly in the
initiative, probably would have made it fail at the polls. 62 This outcome is
easy to predict given the previous pathologies: low information, inability to
make tradeoffs, sequential elimination of agenda items, and no selection
process for agenda setters. The budget-busting effect may be limited by the
legislature's ability to avoid implementation. 63 This may provoke further
initiatives by policy advocates, however, who want their policies
implemented. One can see this degenerating into a spiral of initiative
passage, poor implementation, initiative passage, poor implementation, and
so on. Given that initiatives are going to hand the legislature extreme and
conflicting policies to implement, the legislature will do its best to ignore
its instructions. For example, even though in 1986 California voters passed
Proposition 63, the "English Only" initiative, the legislature never actually
implemented it.64 In fact, Attorney General John Van de Kamp argued that
by his reading, the initiative only required that official publications were
available in English, not that they were to be limited to English.65 When
voters pass laws that tie the legislature's hands it further complicates
policymaking. It seems unlikely that further disguising the effects of policy
is likely to improve its quality.
Even if legislatures are able to get around initiatives, each time they
do so they lose degrees of freedom. California responded to the legislative
staffing cuts mandated by Proposition 140 by cutting their expert staff in
half, but leaving political staff largely intact, 66 and by moving the state
library out of the legislature and to the Department of Education. These
one-time moves had serious consequences for the operation and staffing of
62. John Matsusaka, Nolan McCarty, and Gerber argue that states with the initiative process
have different outcomes on a variety of policy variables than states without initiatives, and that this
difference is due to the presence of the initiative process. See GERBER, supra note 3, at 121-36;
MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY, supra note 3, at 3; Gerber, supra note 2, at 121; Matsusaka, Evidence,
supra note 3, at 590; Matsusaka & McCarty, supra note 3, at 413-14. Matsusaka's comprehensive
analysis finds that initiative states spend less, controlling for other factors. We agree that this important
question deserves further empirical study. Matsusaka, Evidence, supra note 3. In addition to spending
less, initiative states also have much less flexibility in their spending. California's Proposition 98 and
Colorado's "Taxpayers' Bill of Rights," for example, severely restrict the abilities of state governments
to react to fiscal shocks by locking in spending on education (Proposition 98) and restricting total
spending (Taxpayers' Bill of Rights).
63. GERBER ET AL., supra note 4, at 15-26.
64. Id. at 34-37.
65. Id. at 36.
66. BRUCE E. CAIN & THAD KOUSSER, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., ADAPTING TO TERM LIMITS:
RECENT EXPERIENCES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 38-39 (2004).
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the legislature and the library that limit future policy tradeoffs. This may
have been of small import previously, but, with the increasing use of
initiatives to change policy and reform constitutions, further constraints
may be placed on legislative activity. Indeed, as direct democracy ties up
the legislatures, we may begin to run afoul of Article 4, § 4 of the
Constitution, which guarantees every state a republican form of
government. 67 Central to this question will be what we believe are the
necessary conditions for republican government. Is it just an elective
government? Or, must the elected representatives have the ability to also
change policy? This is not a question for us to answer, but it is one that will
be important as initiatives increasingly tie the hands of state legislatures.
VI. THE RISE OF CRYPTO-INITIATIVES
During the 2004 general elections, there were 162 ballot measures in
thirty-four states. California led the pack with sixteen total ballot measures,
twelve of which qualified by the initiative process. 68 Although final figures
are not yet tallied, estimates are that more than $600 million was spent
nationally on initiative campaigns and more than $192 million was spent in
California alone.69 Many scholars, somewhat naively, tend to see these
initiatives as attempts by citizens to change public policy. 70 But, as the
following anecdotes from 2004 illustrate, a large and increasing number of
initiatives are designed by agenda setters, often from outside the state or
locality in which the initiative is being run, who have other goals in mind;
for them, affecting policy is often at most a secondary concern. We term
67.

See Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the

Constitution'sGuarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807 (2002).

68. Initiative and Referendum Inst., Univ. of S. Cal., Election 2004 Preview, BALLOTWATCH,
Sept. 2004, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202004-1%20(Preview).pdf.
69. The California figure represents all expenditures by initiative PACs between January 1, 2004
and October 26, 2004 for which spending data was available on the Secretary of State's Web site.
70. Other scholars have long recognized that initiatives often have purposes beyond their policy
applications. For a survey of the literature on this point, see Smith, supra note 1. In recent years, the
Republican Party has directed much financial support to Grover Norquist's "Americans for Tax
Reform" in order to back tax limitation, right to work, and paycheck protection initiatives aimed at
spurring conservative mobilization in California, Colorado, and Oregon. Daniel A. Smith, Special
Interests and Direct Democracy: An HistoricalGlance, in THE BATrLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 59,

67 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001). Even an examination of Colorado's 1912 direct democracy campaigns
revealed that "the mechanisms of the initiative and popular referendum were easily manipulated during
the Progressive Era." Daniel A. Smith & Joseph Lubinski, Direct Democracy During the Progressive
Era: A Crack in the Populist Veneer?, 14 J. POL'Y HIST. 349, 369 (2002). While such works have

examined the behavioral effects of crypto-initiatives, they have not yet probed the social choice
consequences of the intentions of their backers.
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these crypto-initiatives. The hidden aspects of crypto-initiatives are the
motives of their sponsors and their connections to political parties.
In many cases, the initiatives of 2004 had their roots in prior elections.
In 2000, George W. Bush beat Al Gore in Ohio by a slim margin-less
than 170,000 votes out of more than 4.5 million votes cast. As the 2004
election between President Bush and John Kerry crystallized, it was clear
that Ohio would again be a very close race and it would be one of the few
states to decide the election. Democrats campaigned extensively in Ohio to
improve their odds of winning the state. 71 State Republican leaders
coordinated with the White House on one of the "defense of marriage"
initiatives, which they hoped would increase Republican turnout and help
Bush carry Ohio.7 2 Leading up to the election it seemed that this strategy
had a reasonable chance of securing Bush the win because, although Kerry
would likely beat Bush in urban areas, the marriage initiative was projected
to have a significant effect on the electorate, amounting to a 2% to 3%
increase in turnout, with the largest increase coming in the conservative
Christian demographic. 73 As it turned out, Bush indeed won Ohio and the
presidency. While the evidence is not conclusive as to the effect of Ohio's
defense of marriage initiative, 74 after the election Ohio
political analysts credit[ed] the ballot measure with increasing turnout in
Republican bastions in the south and west, while also pushing swing
voters in the Appalachian region of the southeast toward Mr. Bush. The
President's extra-strong showing in those areas compensated for an
extraordinarily large Democratic turnout 75
in Cleveland and in Columbus,
propelling him to a 136,000-vote victory.
71. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Gay Marriage Becomes a Swing Issue With Pull, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2004, at A7. The group America Coming Together had spent $1.1 million and deployed 700
employees in Ohio by the end of April 2004 to oppose President Bush's reelection. DEREK WILLIS,
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, VOTER TURNOUT GROUP FOCUSES ON OHIO: AMERICA COMING TOGETHER
PUTS HUNDREDS OF EMPLOYEES INTO BUCKEYE STATE (2004), at http://www.publicintegrity.org/

527/report.aspx?aid=333&sid=300.
72. Kirkpatrick, supra note 71.
73. John C. Green, Ohio: The Heart ofIt All, 2 FORUM 1 (2004).
74. See Smith, supra note I (finding that voter support for Ohio's defense of marriage initiative
had an insignificant effect on county-level turnout but did significantly affect a county's vote for Bush).
This last result is the best test of the effect of the initiative on Bush's vote.
75. James Dao, Same-Sex MarriageIssue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004,
at P4. Smith, however, in his analysis of county-level data, did not find that Ohio's gay marriage
amendment had significant effects on voter turnout in Ohio. Smith, supra note 1. At the same time, all
that may be necessary for the spread of such crypto-initiatives is the perception among relevant political
actors that they can affect turnout or election outcomes.
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While Karl Rove 76 may be the only one who knows if this account is
accurate, Ohio's defense of marriage initiative was a key factor in Bush's
reelection.
A defense of marriage initiative also appears to have affected political
outcomes in Kentucky. This time the likely beneficiary of the initiative was
Republican Senator Jim Bunning, who barely retained his Senate seat.
Bunning had been in the midst of running what may be one of the worst
political campaigns of all time.7 7 His twenty-point lead in the polls
evaporated during the campaign, and some of his behavior and statements
led Democrats to directly question his sanity.7 8 "Supporters of the [defense
of marriage initiative] used extensive church networks to persuade people
to vote," and the support of conservative voters may have helped Bunning
secure victory. 79 To help Bunning, Republicans tried to tie opposition to
80
the initiative around the neck of Democratic candidate Daniel Mongiardo.
Bunning eventually overcame his own campaign to win reelection.
Although there is not yet definitive empirical evidence regarding the effects
of the different defense of marriage initiatives, the proponents appear to
have intended effects beyond mere policy change. 81 In the November 2004
election, eleven states (Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah)
considered defense of marriage initiatives, and they all passed. Bush and
76. In 2004, Rove was a senior advisor and chief strategist to President Bush.
77. According to one report,
Mr. Bunning's difficulties began earlier ... [in 2004] when he suggested that Dr. Mongiardo
looked like Saddam Hussein's sons. Later he debated Dr. Mongiardo from a television studio
in Washington, and admitted afterward having used a teleprompter to read his opening and
closing statements. Then he told reporters he had not heard about the Army reservists in Iraq
who had refused a mission because they felt it unsafe. 'I don't watch the national news, and I
don't read the paper,' Mr. Bunning explained. 'I haven't done that for the last six weeks. I
watch Fox News to get my information.'
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Onetime Senate Shoo-in Now Struggles to Hold on, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2004, at A20.
78. Ryan Alessi, Delano Massey & Karla Ward, Bunning Win Harderthan Expected, Race Was
Contentious, Personal,LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Nov. 3, 2004, at AAi.

79. Dao, supra note 75, at 4.
80. Id.
81.
David Karol and Edward Miguel argue that the defense of marriage initiatives had no effect
on the vote for Bush, but they do not take account of the strategic use of initiatives or the possibility that
they have different effects in different states. See David Karol & Edward Miguel, Iraq War Casualties
and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election (Apr. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), at
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/emiguel/miguel-iraq.pdf. First, turnout may only be an important aspect
of the initiative in certain states (such as Ohio), whereas in other states (like Mississippi) the initiative
may have other goals. Second, the goal may not be to increase turnout for the national election but
instead for state or local elections. Smith finds little support for the contention that the Ohio defense of
marriage initiative increased Republican turnout, although he does find that the initiative affected a
county's vote for Bush. Smith, supra note 1.
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other Republican candidates either won or did better than previously
expected in these states.
On the other side of the political spectrum, Democrats have also been
using initiatives to try to bolster registration and turnout. In 2004, the
82
Association of Community Organization for Reform Now ("ACORN"),
through a PAC called Floridians for All, spent millions of dollars to support
an initiative to raise the state's minimum wage. The group chose the
minimum wage as its instrument because, according to an internal
document acquired by the Washington Times, their "plan concluded that
initiatives increase voter turnout and that 'minimum wage initiatives can
significantly increase the turnout of supporters without increasing turnout
from the opposition.' 83 ACORN declared its three major goals to be
"driving heightened Democratic turnout, passing the initiative, and building
permanent political capacity for future gains." 84 In addition to targeting a
proposed initiative at its ideal audience, Floridians for All registered more
than 200,000 initiative signers as voters, 85 which boosted their signature
count and the number of registered voters who supported their petition,
possibly having a significant effect on statewide elections this year and into
the future. These efforts have drawn scrutiny from the Florida Department
of Law Enforcement, which is investigating to86determine whether or not
ACORN engaged in illegal registration activity.
82. In a clear, but perhaps overly humble, statement of their activity, ACORN declares,
When most community organizations still believed in sitting on the sidelines on election day,
ACORN was leading the way in voter registration, education, and mobilization. In the most
recent election cycle, ACORN registered over 200,000 new voters, and made over 1 million
non-partisan contacts to infrequent voters encouraging them to vote.
Acom.org, Who is Acorn?, at http://www.acom.org/index.php?id=2 (last visited May 5, 2005). One
might question the "non-partisan" nature of its contacts, given the information above. According to
their Web site, www.acom.org, in recent years ACORN has led ballot initiative campaigns in San
Francisco, Phoenix, Pine Bluff City, and Kansas City. They work closely with their "sister"
organization, Project Vote, to build "voter registration, education and mobilization networks" to turnout
"new and infrequent voters around issues that are important to their families and communities, thus
giving previous non-voters a reason to vote." ASS'N OF CMTY. ORGS. FOR REFORM Now, 2003
ANNUAL REPORT 24 (2003), at http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/ACORNReports/ACORNANNREPT2_copy.pdf.
83. Jerry Seper, Liberals Target Bush with Florida Wage Initiative,WASH. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004,
at A3. It is richly ironic that in 1995 ACORN sued the state of California because having to pay their
own workers a minimum wage would reduce the number of employees they could hire. Associated
Press, Critics Point to Effort by ACORN to Dodge Minimum Wage in '96, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 11,
2004, available at http://www.miami.conmld/miamiherald/news/state/9375352.htm? lc.
84. Seper, supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. This begs the question, of course, about the actual effect of the initiative on voter turnout.
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In Colorado, during the 2004 election cycle, donors and the
Democratic Party also utilized the initiative process to affect the state and
national elections. Most national attention focused on the wealthy president
of a Brazilian university who spent millions in a vain attempt to pass an
initiative that would have allocated Colorado's electoral votes on a
proportional basis. 87 Other lesser noticed initiatives, however, may have
been far more important in the 2004 election in Colorado. The Democratic
Party, after its losses in 2002, started to plan a series of initiatives to drive
turnout and change voting patterns. Using extensive databases to tie
together political, demographic, consumer, and other information, political
operatives sought to identify areas in the state, and the individuals living
within them, that "under-performed" in the 2002 election.8 8 That is, they
wanted to find likely Democratic voters who either did not turnout or who
turned out but voted Republican. Through waves of phone surveys,
personal interviews, and shopping mall focus groups, the political
strategists discovered a demographic that was unhappy and highly
motivated about transportation (they complained bitterly about their daily
commutes to and from downtown Denver). In response, these Democratic
Party activists helped sponsor an initiative in 2004: FasTracks, which
increased mass transit funding. 89 One of the critical aspects of this strategy
was getting Republicans, such as Governor Bill Owens, to oppose the
measure, which would provide a cue to the targeted voters that their
interests were more similar to Democrats than Republicans. As expected,
Governor Owens publicly opposed the transit initiative. When the $3.5
million campaign for the transit initiative was done and the election results
were counted, it appeared that the Democratic strategy had worked on
multiple fronts. First, although the initiative was designed to be
instrumental in generating turnout, the policy proposal also passed. Second,
while the rest of the country was electing Republicans, Colorado elected
Democrats to the U.S. Senate, U.S. House, and Colorado Assembly.
Indeed, Democrats now have control of the Colorado legislature for the
first time in over forty years. 90
87. Susan Greene, Group Pushesfor Vote Switch: Colo. Would Split PresidentialTally, DENVER
POST, June 15, 2004, at Al.
88. This information is based on interviews with an anonymous source who worked with the
Colorado Democratic Party.
89. See Kevin Flynn, Transit Tax Hike Full-Speed Ahead, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 3,
2004, at 7A, available at http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/election/article/0,1299,DRMN_
363301207,00.html.
90. Lynne Bartels & Peggy Lowe, The Politics of Power: After 4 Decades, Democrats Regain
Legislative Control, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 8, 2005, at 23A.
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The anecdotes just offered suggest that thinking about initiatives only
in terms of their policy outcomes ignores other potentially significant
effects on registration, turnout, and election results. As a matter of fact, if
initiatives determine who wins the presidency, Congress, and state
legislatures, we are ignoring their most important effects.
In what follows we show that initiatives are indeed known to affect
voter turnout and we provide a model of how wedge and jack issues do so.
These forms of crypto-initiatives are particularly problematic because they
are a form of political pork and the combination of 527s and party
involvement is likely to increase their use. Finally, we argue that the
implicit analogy between the initiative market and economic markets is not
applicable and does not eliminate the problems we have raised throughout
this Article.
A. INITIATIVES ARE KNOWN TO AFFECT TURNOUT
We have been using the term crypto-initiatives to refer to cases where
the proponents' primary goal is to affect political outcomes rather than
policy. Such initiatives-also discussed by Garrett and Smith 9 -- often
achieve their goals by reshaping the electorate. For an initiative to
influence elections by shifting the composition of the electorate in a way
that favors a party's candidates, it must boost turnout or bring out a
different type of voter. This would not be the case if initiatives like
FasTracks or the defense of marriage initiatives turned out new voters who
represented a random draw from those who do not typically participate in
American elections. Smart political actors do not spend millions to turn out
a random selection of nonvoters. Their efforts are targeted in two ways:
they want to get voters who support their candidates to the polls, and they
aim their message at those who are likely to be most receptive. The first
tactical consideration partly explains why, even though nonvoters have
demographic characteristics that might link them to the Democratic Party,
elections with higher turnout do not consistently benefit Democratic
candidates. A long scholarly literature 92 rebuts the conventional wisdom
that higher turnout will shift the electorate leftward. If Republican groups
91.

See Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure,3 ELECTION L.J. 237, 242 (2004);

ELIZABETH GARRET & DANIEL A. SMITH, VEILED POLITICAL ACTORS: THE REAL THREAT TO
CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE STATUTES (USC-Caltech Ctr. for the Study of Law and Politics, Working
Paper No. 13, 2002), at http://lawweb.usc.edu/cslp/papers/cslp-wp-013.pdf; Smith, supra note 1.

92. See Jack Citrin, Eric Schickler & John Sides, What If Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact
of Increased Turnout in Senate Elections, 47 AM. J. POL. Sc. 75 (2003); Benjamin Highton &
Raymond E. Wolfinger, The PoliticalImplications of Higher Turnout, 31 BRIT. J. POE. SCI. 179 (2001).
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run a strong mobilization effort, then a boost in turnout could bring more of
their party's adherents to the polls. Studies of election outcomes 93 show
that there is no consistent partisan bias when turnout increases.
The second tactical consideration for mobilizing turnout is to choose
issues that are likely to resonate with nonvoters, which may lead to turnout
different than a simple random sample of nonvoters. As a whole, nonvoters
are less politically interested and less partisan than voters. The nonvoters
who are most receptive, however, to a campaign's "get out the vote"
drive-especially one based on an initiative's policy effects-are likely to
be the most politically engaged, educated, and partisan members of that
group. Campaigns conducting "strategic mobilization" 94 target these voters,
whose sense of the stakes of politics and psychological attachment to one
of the "teams" allow them to see the benefits of turning out. Turnout
initiatives that seek to tempt voters to the polls by offering a policy that
they strongly favor could attract a subset of nonvoters that is
unrepresentative of the mass of nonvoters.
Recent works on initiatives and turnout suggest that this is, in fact,
often the case. First, Caroline Tolbert, John Grummel, and Smith 95 show
that a greater number of initiatives on the ballot boosts turnout in both
presidential and midterm elections, controlling for a host of other factors.
But what types of voters are brought to the polls by propositions? Todd
Donovan and Smith 96 examined the results of exit polls in three states to
see how the voters who said that initiatives motivated them to turn out
differed from other voters. The differences vary across states, but are
generally consistent with the notion that these mobilized voters look very
different from the overall set of those who do not regularly vote. "Partisan
identifiers (Democrats in Arizona and Colorado; strong partisans of both
parties in Colorado), those with self-identified ideological predispositions
(in Colorado), older (in Oregon and Colorado), and better educated (in
Colorado) respondents were most likely to say that initiatives figured
heavily in their decisions to participate in an election. 9 7
93. See James DeNardo, Turnout and the Vote: The Joke's on the Democrats, 74 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 406 (1980); Jack H. Nagel & John E. McNulty, Partisan Effects of Voter Turnout in Senatorial
and GubernatorialElections,90 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 780 (1996).
94. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1993).

95.

See Effects of Ballot Initiatives,supra note 37.

96. TODD DONOVAN & DANIEL A. SMITH, TURNING ON AND TURNING OUT: ASSESSING THE
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL EFFECTS OF BALLOT MEASURES (USC-Caltech Ctr. for the Study of Law and

Politics, Working Paper No. 32, 2004), at http:/Alawweb.usc.edu/cslp/papers/cslp-wp-032.pdf.
97. Id. at 18.
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The anecdotes presented at the beginning of this section suggest that
political operatives have discovered the immense partisan possibilities of
initiatives and are increasing their usage of the process. Setting of the
initiative agenda by party operatives would not seem to be a happy
occurrence because strategic political actors will pick strategies, which we
call either wedges or jacks, to serve their partisan goals even if they lead to
the passage of bad policies. Increasing usage of these types of initiatives
will exacerbate their negative consequences.
B. WEDGE INITIATIVES
We use the term "wedge initiatives" to describe those that are
designed to split the opposing party and help one's own party by drawing
support from the opposition. The following two conditions are necessary
for a wedge issue: first, the status quo must be favored by the other party,
and particularly the status quo must help extreme members of the other
party; second, a change in status quo must benefit the party looking to use
the initiative. Figure 3 presents this situation spatially. M represents the
dispersion of ideal points within the majority party, which is protecting the
SQ even though it is far from the floor median, F. The minority party, m,
can use a wedge, w, to induce a portion of the majority party to support a
change in policy on this dimension (everyone to the left of c will prefer w
to SQ, and thus w drives a wedge, at c, into the majority party). To insure
the support of F, the minority will offer a new policy that is at or near F's
ideal point. The possible shifts in alliances generated by this dynamic
98
create a situation akin to William Riker' s coalition model of politics.
FIGURE 3. Model of wedge issues
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One such example of a wedge issue is Proposition 187, which
California Republicans actively supported in 1994. This initiative helped
convince some Democrats, whose party opposed the initiative, to abandon
98.

WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962).
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their party in the gubernatorial race and support the Republican candidate,
Pete Wilson, who sponsored the initiative.
While these wedge issues, when effective, will divide the electorate
and change party allegiance at least for one election, their long-term effects
may not be salutary. If wedge initiatives succeed, we can see that, over
time, as each party slams a wedge between the other party and its leaders,
the electorate may become increasingly distrustful of parties and
government. Consequently, the parties may be unable to set the agenda in
such a way that maintains their coalitions (by keeping wedge issues off the
agenda), as all of their compromises will be exploited by the opposition in
initiatives. Parties may either fractionalize or coalesce around issues that
clearly divide them from the opposition, thus increasing partisan
polarization.
One effect of wedge issues is that representatives are elected based on
their stance on a single-issue initiative. In such a case, voters truly become
single-issue electors, picking candidates for office that they may not
ordinarily choose were a full range of issues considered. This is a standard
problem in political campaigns, but it is magnified when initiatives focus
the electorate on a single policy dimension. The defense of marriage
initiatives in 2004 represent a rather clear example of this phenomenon, as
the anecdotes from Kentucky and Ohio suggest.
In addition, wedge issues present a particularly difficult issue for voter
information models. Because the initiative is not about policy, but about
turnout, the sponsor of the wedge would actually like opposition, as doing
so makes it easier to tie it around the other party's neck. The wedge serves
as bait, and if the other party takes it, then it will become clear that the
party is protecting some of its extreme members. Therefore, if the
opposition understands it is a wedge issue, they should vacillate on the
issue, remain quiet, and try to keep it off the agenda. The mere fact that
there are extreme policies that have not moved to the floor median suggests
that the majority party has already been quite effective in keeping it off the
agenda until the initiative was raised. If the opposition follows its political
incentives and stays silent on the initiative, then we are left with an
environment that does not meet the conditions for voters to make informed
decisions.
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JACK INITIATIVES

A "jack initiative" is designed to help a party's candidates by
increasing turnout in one targeted portion of the electorate. 99 The growth of
jack initiatives is particularly troubling. These policies are likely to have
highly concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, which helps increase turnout
only among beneficiaries. Geographically targeted projects, such as new
roads, rail lines, and schools, for example, seem to be ideal policies that
have this effect at the local level. The passage of FasTracks and minimum
wage initiatives are prototypical examples of this type of statewide policy.
The ACORN document that discussed the Florida minimum wage strategy
makes the targeted benefits clear: "'Giving our constituency an opportunity
to vote themselves a raise is probably the most compelling reason to go to
the ballot box." 10 0 It is hard to think of a more direct, targeted benefit than
the ability to vote yourself a raise, paid for by a highly diffuse set of
consumers and businesses. The minimum wage issue was also important
because it had a differential effect on turnout. It did not generate unified
business opposition (many businesses already pay wages well above the
minimum wage and so had little incentive to oppose it), and therefore the
opposition campaign did not motivate its likely supporters. Considered in
this light, jack initiatives look a lot like a new form of distributive politics,
which has been well and thoroughly discussed in the Congressional and
policy literature.' 0 1 Initiatives that fall into this category not only have
effects on the larger political process, but they also act to increase the
99. Jacks and wedges may not be mutually exclusive categories for any given policy. That is, a
defense of marriage initiative may be a wedge in one state and a jack in another. It will depend on the
configuration of political interests in each environment.
100. Seper, supra note 83.
101.
See CLYDE 1. BROWNING, THE GEOGRAPHY OF FEDERAL OUTLAYS (1973); MORRIS P.
FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES (1974); R. Michael Alvarez & Jason
L. Saving, Deficits, Democrats,and DistributiveBenefits: CongressionalElections and the Pork Barrel
in the 1980s, 50 POL. RES. Q. 809 (1997); Carol F. Goss, Military Committee Membership and DefenseRelated Benefits in the House of Representatives, 25 W. POL. Q. 215 (1972); Eric Helland, The Waiver

Pork Barrel: Committee Membership and the Approval Time of Medicaid Waivers, 17 CONTEMP.
ECON. POL'Y 401 (1999); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of
Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & EcON. 103 (1990);
Steven D. Levitt & James M. Snyder, Jr., PoliticalParties and the Distributionof Federal Outlays, 39
AM. J. POL. SCt. 958 (1995); James T. Murphy, Political Partiesand the Porkbarrel:Party Conflict and
Cooperation in House Public Works Committee Decision-Making, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 169 (1974);

Brian E. Roberts, A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distributionof FederalBenefits, 34
AM. J. POL. Sci. 31 (1990); Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions:Market-

Preserving Federalismand Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
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amount of pork in the political environment. 1°2 Therefore, the effects of
jack initiatives must include the additional pork that they introduce into
politics and the effect that pork has on the quality of policy.
A good jack issue will only cause a targeted group of potential
supporters to turn out to the polls, likely because a proposal has
concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. In this environment there is
unlikely to be organized opposition to the initiative. Without an opposition,
the campaign environment does not meet the conditions for full
information10 3 or trust,' ° 4 so there is no reason to believe outcomes will
improve on the status quo. These jack issues are not designed for the
greater public good. Indeed, extensive polling was done in Colorado to find
issues that had concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, and that drive
turnout up for one party but not the other. Policy is not the point; good
public policy would only be a fortunate, if unlikely, accident.
Certainly pork barrel policy has been extensively used by legislatures
to serve political purposes, and we should believe that pork barrel
initiatives will also become increasingly popular as the results in Colorado
have demonstrated. No one believes that such distributive pork barrel
politics makes for good public policy.
While the use of crypto-initiatives is not new,10 5 we seem to be
witnessing a new trend as political parties, individuals, and interest groups
are all scouring the policy space to find niche issues for the purpose of
affecting elections or rewarding or punishing candidates and parties. This
trend, coupled with the rise of 527s106-so called silent partners-who can
102. Shaun Bowler and Donovan discuss distributive logrolls as a new twist on initiatives, but in
their formulation these initiatives are still about passing policy, not some nonpolicy goals such as
increasing voter turnout. See BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 37. Because of this difference the
critical issue for jack initiatives may not be how people vote on the actual proposal, but whether or not
its presence has differential effects on turnout.
103. See Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Term Limits, Responsiveness and the Failures of
Increased Competition, in LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS: PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVES 87, 87-99

(Bernard Grofman ed., 1996).
104. See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 30, 79-93.
105. See Daniel A. Smith & Caroline J. Tolbert, The Initiative to Part): Partisanshipand Ballot
Initiatives in California, 7 PARTY POL. 739 (2001) (discussing the role of political parties in the
California initiative process and finding that parties appear to be more prominent in the process than
intended by initiative supporters). We do not contest Smith and Tolbert's findings but we do emphasize
the increase in these crypto-initiatives and the role that newly formed 527s will have on cryptoinitiatives.
106. Garrett & Smith, supra note 91, at 47-51.
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spend tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars in relative obscurity 10 7 for
campaign activities (527s spent a combined $544 million in the 2003-2004
election cycle) may turn an already impaired method of policymaking and
institutional reform into the tool of twenty-first century party machines and
their operatives, where the social good is at most a remote thought.
VII. THE EFFICIENT INITIATIVE MARKET?
Although scholars are ambiguous about why positive outcomes will
occur via the initiative process, they appear to have something in mind like
an "efficient initiative hypothesis" ("EIH"), which they consider to be an
analogy to the efficient market hypothesis ("EMH"). Although there is no
well-developed analogy between markets and initiatives, Matsusaka most
clearly compares the initiative process to the market by briefly considering
how two hallmarks of markets-dispersed information and competitive
forces-can be applied to the initiative process.' 018 As he makes clear,
neither of these approaches have been sufficiently elaborated on to be very
useful in understanding the initiative process. Nonetheless, it seems that,
from the literature on initiatives, scholars have an implicit version of the
E1H in mind, in which outcomes are positive as long as voters support them
(notice all of the results in the literature referring to surveys finding that the
median voter favors enacted initiatives). Because the comparison is not
well developed, we present what we think is the most likely way scholars
are thinking of the initiative process, and then we consider why the analogy
between initiatives and markets is inappropriate.
It seems to us that the most likely model implicit in the literature is
one in which policy entrepreneurs propose different products, and then
voters acting as policy consumers choose which ones to purchase by
casting their scarce votes. In the EMH, price conveys all publicly available
information about an asset, given the decisions of well-informed and
rational market traders. 10 9 Consumers purchase only the products that serve
their goals, and guided by the invisible hand, the aggregate outcome is
107. Each state has different reporting requirements and 527s tend to share money so that
resources can end up where the party needs them, but in such a way that it is difficult to determine, at
least prior to the election, which group is funding which initiatives and how much they are spending.
108.

See MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY, supra note 3.

109. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, Volatility Tests and Efficient Markets: A Review Essay, 27 J.
MONETARY ECON. 463 (1991); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding
Market Efficiency, 6 1. FIN. ECON. 95 (1978); J. S. Jordan, On the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, 51
ECONOMETRICA 1325 (1983); A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J.
EcoN. LITERATURE 13 (1997).
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welfare enhancing, or efficient. If this is the analogy being used, then we
presume that the collective decisions of market participants are represented
by the median voter, and policy entrepreneurs are equivalent to marketers
who introduce new products. If this is the appropriate analogy, then we
conclude that policies supported by the median voter must improve
welfare.
The basic analogy, however, between efficient markets and initiatives
is not reasonable. First, what in the EIH plays the role of price in the EMH?
One cannot simply gloss over the absence of something equivalent to price,
because prices, and the information they convey, are the heart of the
EMH. 110 So, unless there is a suitable analog in the initiative process, then
the analogy between the EMH and the EIH simply makes no sense.
Second, there is no clear theory about how selecting the median voter's
ideal point on a series of one-dimensional issues is likely to improve net
welfare. Is there something equivalent to the invisible hand of the median
voter? Third, for reasons already discussed, voters will often lack the
information necessary to make decisions equivalent to the decisions of
consumers in a market (who base their choices on price, which is absent in
the EIH). In situations that do not qualify as complete information, such as
when there are not credible endorsers on both sides of a policy or there are
multiple initiatives with multiple endorsers, we do not know whether voters
will act to become informed or not; we suspect they will not. We are
betting our democracy and the quality of our lives on a hunch, an
undeveloped analogy, that politicians will not lie to us. Fourth, when
making consumption decisions, people are able to make decisions
simultaneously on multiple dimensions and can thus make tradeoffs among
their various choices. But such decisions are difficult, if not impossible, in
choosing among initiatives."' 1
110. Alternatively, while we are not sure of all the conditions required for competitive markets to
arise and to function well (that is, to be efficient or nearly so), we know that one of the basic
requirements is accurate and timely information, uniformly available to all market participants.
Information generation and learning are costly. Consequently, the value of information or knowledge
may exceed its costs for all but a few participants. This situation in itself is a form of market failure, and
asymmetry of information may be a source of market power and is often thought to be a source of
political power.
111.
Think of each initiative battle as a market share competition in which consumers choose
between the status quo and a new product, much as they do between Coke and Pepsi or Ford and
Toyota. The alternative preferred by most consumers gets the highest market share and wins. The
trouble with this analogy is that voters are left with no way to consider tradeoffs across different types
of goods. A consumer with a finite budget constraint recognizes that her choice of a higher priced
product for one type of good constrains her choices in another area. Legislators dealing with multiple
issues at once also face such a budget constraint. For consumers who spend only their votes, though, no
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Fifth, we have spent many pages demonstrating how, in the end,
policy can be Pareto inefficient, even when the median favors each policy
choice dimension by dimension. Sixth, the initiative process can be
manipulated by agenda setting, which determines what options voters see
and the order in which they are considered. Neither of these last two
problems with the initiative process have an analog in markets. Seventh,
there seems to be a common theme among initiative proponents that simply
having more options makes voters better off. There is not a clear theory of
how aggregating voters' decisions across a variety of political dimensions
improves policy outcomes. Such an assumption is based on something akin
to the invisible hand of economic markets, but there is not an analog to
price, which would have to exist for us to believe there is an invisible hand
for the initiative market. Furthermore, the problems with the initiative
information environment that we discussed earlier also make it unlikely
that simply offering a multitude of options will improve social welfare. For
these reasons it seems unreasonable to use the EMH to understand
initiatives.
This discussion leads us to believe that there is not an efficient market
for initiatives. The previously discussed pathologies of initiatives are not
overcome simply by comparing voters to consumers and initiatives to
products. Given the problems with the initiative process, it is unclear why
aggregating policy preferences via a series of uncoordinated, lowinformation elections will lead to improved outcomes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Lupia and Matsusaka faithfully report that "recent breakthroughs in
theory and empirical analysis paint a comparatively positive picture of the
initiative and referendum."" 2 We have attempted to provide more troubling
empirical examples along with theoretical reasons to be less sanguine.
Throughout this Article we have presented a variety of reasons why the
initiative process in general, and crypto-initiatives in particular, are
unlikely to improve policy outcomes. In fact, all of the institutional
solutions to social choice problems that scholars have studied1 13 are
such disciplining constraint is in place, allowing them to always pick the more costly option without
forcing them to consider the costs of their choices.
112. Lupia & Matsusaka, supra note 3, at 463.
113. See Shepsle, supra note 8; Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 8; George Tsebelis, Decision
Making in PoliticalSystems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,Parliamentarism,Multicameralism and

Multipartyism, 25 BRrr. J. POL. Sc. 289 (1995); Gordon Tullock, Why So Much Stability?, 37 PUB.
CHOICE 189 (1981).
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insufficient in the initiative context. This should be a strong indication that
outcomes are unlikely to be positive, as we demonstrated in our discussion
of social choice problems for initiatives. Furthermore, it is clear that
information problems will plague the initiative process, particularly when
initiatives are chosen so as not to arouse opposition. Despite the possibility
of negative social effects, political activists have picked up on the success
of crypto-initiatives in 2004 and are encouraging others to use initiatives to
set their own agendas in 2005 and beyond. The deleterious consequences of
partisan manipulation of the initiative agenda is further affected by the rise
of 527 crypto-PACs. Crypto-initiatives will tend to be particularistic and
will typically not foster the creation of a voter-friendly information
environment or a social-welfare enhancing choice environment. The
combined effect of crypto-initiatives and crypto-PACs seems very unlikely
to improve social welfare.
Our conclusion about the potentially grave flaws in the initiative
process begs the question of whether the legislative process is a better way
to make law. Legislative lawmaking includes the ability to make tradeoffs
through the budget process, greater resources to study and determine
possible effects of policy change, and, compared to constitutional
amendments, creates law that is less permanent. Despite the advantages of
the legislative process, we do acknowledge that there are times when the
legislature may be corrupt or captured by special interests. In those
circumstances, the initiative may be a useful way to change policy, but it
should be made more difficult to change policy via initiatives so that
political actors use them only when the legislature is particularly
ineffective.
We also recognize that the legislature may suffer from many of the
same social choice problems that plague initiatives. There are two
important differences, however. First, the legislature has to make policy
tradeoffs within its budget process every year or two. So, even if adopted
policies are rushed, one-dimensional, or the result of pandering, eventually
the state has to face tradeoffs in passing its budget. This process helps to
mitigate problems from the initial adoption. Second, the legislature
typically does not amend the constitution, so changes are not permanent
and can be amended or repealed by statute as opposed to initiatives that
often amend the state constitution. The greater flexibility of legislative
policy avoids solidifying bad policy choices. Also, changes in public
opinion that affect the election of legislators can affect public policy
through the legislature, rather than by requiring someone to bring an
initiative and pass it if the public wants to amend or repeal a previously
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passed constitutional amendment. For these two reasons, the legislature
seems to provide more hope for comprehensive and responsive lawmaking
than the initiative process.
Since initiatives, campaign finance reform, and the other imperfect
reforms of the twentieth century seem here to stay, we offer three proposals
that we believe would improve the outcomes of the initiative process. First,
require initiatives to meet the "pay as you go" standard, in which new
policy proposals must either contain a funding source or explain what is to
be cut in the budget to fund the new program. The adoption of this proposal
makes the tradeoffs more explicit and also increases the probability of
generating opposition, which is more likely to meet the conditions
necessary for voters to become informed. Second, initiatives should be
subject to amendment by the legislature. Every other type of policymaking
in the United States is subject to checks and balances. In California, and in
many localities, no such legislative or executive checks and balances exist
for initiatives. This condition will force initiative sponsors to recognize the
implementation difficulties faced by the legislature and may also constrain
extreme initiatives because they can be more easily moderated. Third,
initiatives should contain sunset provisions that require the voters or the
legislature to reconsider the policy and determine if they wish to keep it
after a specified time period. This would reduce the permanence of the
constitutional changes and make it easer to roll back ineffective or negative
policies. These three additions to the initiative process will force initiative
sponsors to anticipate the reactions of voters and legislatures to the
tradeoffs inherent in their proposals, and would make it more likely that
initiatives would enhance welfare, even if it makes them less common.

